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1. INTRODUCTION  
What process should be followed to help governments with foreign debts that they can no 
longer service move to a more sustainable situation? Multilateral institutions and 
governments adopted the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, 
supplemented by the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), as an approach for the 
poorest countries. However, they offered only the most general guidance for how the 
governments of countries that borrow primarily from private foreign sources should 
resolve a debt crisis. In essence, the international official sector says, “the parties should 
work it out.” And they have, sometimes in an orderly and smooth way, and sometimes not. 
Numerous authors have proposed policy initiatives to bring more predictability and fairer 
outcomes into sovereign debt workouts for non-HIPCs (in some cases also aiming to 
improve on the HIPC process), ranging from sovereign bankruptcy regimes modeled on 
national corporate bankruptcy systems, to arbitration processes, to standing availability of 
mediation services (see Kaiser, 2008). Others have proposed informal guidelines or a 
“code of good conduct” to which debtors and creditors might subscribe as a way to reduce 
uncertainty about how debt restructuring would proceed. The latter will be the focus of this 
paper. 
While none of the proposed codes has become generally accepted policy, one version of 
the guidelines approach has come close in the sense that a definitive text, the “Principles 
for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets,” was drafted in 
2004 by an international group of private and official authors. The effort was welcomed 
(although the text was not explicitly endorsed) by important international official forums in 
2004 (the Group of 20) and 2005 (the International Monetary and Financial Committee). 
Since then, a group of senior financial officials and financial market executives operating 
under the sponsorship of the private-sector Institute of International Finance have sought to 
spread its adoption.  
Do these Principles solve the problem? That depends on what one sees as the “problem.” If 
the problem is preventing, attenuating or reversing a loss of confidence of private creditors 
when a government experiences debt servicing difficulties, this author’s answer would be, 
sometimes, but not always. But if the problem is defined as helping a government in debt 
difficulty return in an equitable way to an economically, socially and politically sustainable 
debt profile, I would say no, they do not. Moreover, although some parts of the Principles 
are already accepted in general as good practice (parts that can be classified as “crisis 
prevention”), prospects overall seem far less certain for the other parts (those pertaining to 
“crisis resolution”). The latter parts are bound to produce creditor-friendly debt workouts 
that debtor governments will accept if they feel they have no choice but to quickly 
normalize access to foreign credit, even if it does little to ameliorate the economic and 
social consequences of excessive debt servicing. This is a deal that many governments 
have accepted in the past, although others, such as Argentina, have not.  
There are two basic shortcomings with the Principles. One is that they are unbalanced in 
favor of creditor interests. This could be fixed with some redrafting, but that would still 
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leave the second flaw, which is that there is no mechanism to push the sovereign debtor 
and its creditors to abide by them. There is an implicit threat that the private creditors 
might withhold new loans or agreement on restructuring the debt if the sovereign does not 
cooperate (one reason the Principles are pro-creditor biased). However, even this assumes 
a degree of creditor coordination that no longer exists, as evidenced by Argentina’s debt 
restructuring, not to mention the host of private creditor litigation against the poorest 
countries, aiming to take advantage of the relief accorded by their official creditors (see 
IDA and IMF, 2007, pp. 24-28). However, it is possible to envisage an official 
international mechanism that could push the participants toward an orderly, effective and 
fair debt restructuring. The paper concludes with such a proposal, one that is less than a 
sovereign bankruptcy regime but more than the hands-off official approach of recent years.  
In what follows, we first situate the Principles in the context of international policy 
developments for treating sovereign debt crises in the late 1990s and early years of the 
present decade. We then discuss the Principles in some detail and suggest why some of 
their features are attractive and others are not. This in itself suggests what features of a 
more balanced set of principles might look like. We also look at how the Principles have 
been received (without enthusiasm) and see this as an opening for a new approach to the 
problem. We conclude with the proposal alluded to above.  
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2. WHY THIS? WHY NOW? 
Although proposals for codes of conduct in sovereign debt restructuring have a long 
history,3 our story can begin with the financial crises of the 1990s. Beginning with Mexico 
in 1994, followed by several East Asian countries and the Russian Federation in 1997-98, 
each crisis was addressed with packages of internationally guided domestic policy 
adjustments that were complemented by unprecedented volumes of official international 
financing. The aim of the massive financial rescues was to calm panicked investors and 
creditors, and restore their confidence in holding assets of the crisis countries. As the 
countries had previously liberalized their restrictions on international capital account 
transactions, short-term as well as long-term investors had been freed to move funds in and 
out of these economies, which they did in large volumes. The result had been a new 
susceptibility to large swings in financial flows. The vast amounts of international public 
funds that were deployed were meant to boost investor attitudes so that exchange rates 
would stabilize and financial markets would quickly resume normal operations.  
In the Mexican and Russian cases, the primary debtor had been the government. In the East 
Asian countries, the private sector was the primary borrower, but the rescue loans for these 
countries, like those of Mexico and Russia, were all government debt. In the end, each of 
the crisis countries faced large sovereign debt repayment obligations. Although all the 
rescue loans were repaid on time with interest, they became officially distasteful to 
governments of creditor countries by the end of the decade. Policymakers observed that the 
official bailouts in part covered the withdrawal of private funds from debtor countries in 
crisis, and that the creditors had succumbed to moral hazard in lending into highly risky 
situations in the belief — which was largely accurate — that they would be bailed out. 
Taxpayers in the debtor countries were left to pay the bill.  
The new international policy was named “private sector involvement” in debt-crisis 
resolution (see Group of Seven, 1999, paragraph 44). This odd turn of phrase meant that 
the governments of the major creditor countries wished that future debt crises of countries 
with large obligations to private creditors should be resolved less through official financing 
and more through adjustment of the creditors’ claims. This new policy was meant to 
transfer more of the risk back onto those private lenders. The assumption was that the pre-
crisis rush of funds into countries would in the future be tempered by better investor 
appreciation that significant risks were involved. There should also be higher appreciation 
that there were risks in lending directly to developing country governments.  
However, there was no elaboration of how the creditors’ claims would be dealt with when 
the next crisis erupted, except it was understood that the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) could pressure the debtor government and its creditors to work together to solve the 
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 In this author’s understanding, only one such initiative led to an international agreement, the so-called 
“Detailed Features for Future Operations Relating to the Debt Problems of Interested Developing Countries,” 
adopted as an annex to a resolution of the intercessional body of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development in September, 1980 (TDB resolution 222 (XXI)). Although accepted by developed country 
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problem. The pressure could come both from moral suasion and from a policy tool that the 
Fund had adopted in 1989 to push commercial banks to come to terms more quickly with 
the debt-crisis governments at that time. That was the policy of “lending into arrears,” 
meaning that the Fund would continue to support a country financially after default and 
while it accrued arrears on condition that the government actively cooperated with its 
creditors to negotiate a restructuring of the debt obligations.4 In 1998 the policy was 
extended to cover bonds as well as bank loans (see IMF, 2002, pp. 3-7).  
Lending into arrears would work to hasten a restructuring by pressuring both sides, but 
especially the creditors. That is, the IMF announced it would tolerate arrears (which meant 
it would tolerate default) and use its own funds to ameliorate the economic and social cost 
of the default. In such an event, countries might more readily suspend payment, after 
which the market value of their bonds would plunge.5  Bondholders would thus gain little 
advantage from delaying agreement on debt restructuring as it would only postpone the 
recovery in market valuations (whether partial or full) that would come post-workout. 
There would also be pressure on the government not to delay reaching a settlement owing 
to the implicit threat that the IMF would remove support if it stopped seeking a workout. 
Pressure on bondholders to settle owing to the depressed value of their assets also raised 
the likelihood of a one-time restructuring with a “haircut,” as opposed to dragging out the 
workout in a series of inadequate short-term refinancing or rescheduling deals, as had been 
the case with the 1980s bank debt crises and Paris Club treatments (see Garay, 2008 on the 
former and Cosío-Pascal, 2008 on the latter). This was indeed the intention in the first 
application of the policy, Ecuador’s default in 1999, resolved in 2000 (see Sturzenegger 
and Zettelmeyer, 2005, pp. 27-29). This meant that private creditors — now primarily 
bondholders — had to become concerned about how their loans would be handled during a 
“credit event,” something sovereign creditors had not had to think seriously about since the 
1980s. 
In fact, the IMF had an idea of how to organize the parties to facilitate reaching a debt 
restructuring that went beyond just pressuring them to do so. That is, in 2001 the IMF 
management proposed establishing the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(SDRM), which would have acted partly like a bankruptcy regime in creating a statutory 
process for restructuring a government’s debt. This threatened to supersede whatever legal 
mechanisms were embodied in the contractual terms of the loans or bonds and their 
adjudication in the courts of the creditor countries. The creditors were apoplectic and the 
governments that relied on selling their bonds to these creditors became fearful of loss of 
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 In fact, the 1989 policy change came after Argentina, Brazil and certain other countries refused to take 
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 On the other hand, to the degree that IMF’s own lending (before as well as after default) was believed to 
hasten economic recovery and rebuild debt-servicing capacity, it should raise the market value of the bonds 
relative to no IMF lending. In this regard, IMF lending functions like debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing of 
financially distressed corporations, and like DIP financing, creditors accept that IMF has first priority for 
repayment. While the symmetry is not perfect, Bolton and Skeel (2008) propose creating private DIP 
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access (or more expensive access) to foreign finance. SDRM was killed off in 2003 (for a 
review of that episode, see Setser, 2008).  
Without the SDRM, the question remained open of how best to organize a workout from a 
government debt crisis when the preponderance of creditors held tradable bonds. The 
mechanism that had worked in the 1980s to organize hundreds of commercial banks that 
were already largely tied together through participation in loan syndicates was not directly 
applicable to the thousands of holders spread around the world of multiple bond issues that 
were more liquid than the bank loans had been. How should the bondholders be organized 
most effectively into a group (or groups) that could negotiate with the debtor? How would 
the decision to accept or reject the government’s debt restructuring proposal be arranged?  
In part to answer these questions, the international financial sector embraced a proposal to 
change the contractual terms of the bonds, especially bonds issued under New York law, to 
make it easier to restructure the timing and/or amount of payment obligations. The 
intention was to gradually replace old bonds as they matured with new bonds having more 
appropriate “collective action clauses” (CACs). A committee of central bankers had 
proposed this back in 1996, in a study that was known as the “Rey Report,” after Jean-
Jacques Rey, chair of the working party that drafted it (see Group of Ten, 1996). At that 
time it was promptly forgotten. Now CACs would be promoted as a painless alternative to 
SDRM. Indeed, they began to be adopted in early 2003 and have since become new 
“boilerplate” clauses in emerging economy sovereign bond contracts (for the development 
of CACs, see Gelpern and Gulati, 2008).  
While this innovation was deemed to have solved the collective decision problem for 
bondholders that the IMF had highlighted as the main reason to introduce SDRM, it did 
not deal with another side of a typical bankruptcy process. That is, under national 
bankruptcy law, when an insolvent corporation is judged potentially viable after debt 
reduction, a judicial overseer uses the carrots and sticks in the bankruptcy law to push the 
debtor and its creditors together toward an “effective” debt workout, usually meaning one 
that returns as much money to the creditors as a group as is consistent with the debtor 
having a good chance of emerging from insolvency and operating normally into the future.  
It is different when a government is insolvent. While the IMF might advise the debtor 
country on the sustainability of a proposed sovereign debt workout (or, put differently, 
give its view on how much debt reduction overall is “required”), it has no authority over 
the bondholders, who are private citizens and corporations, and varying degrees of 
influence over the government, depending on the state of its relationship at the time with 
the Fund. Also, despite waivers of sovereign immunity already contained in the boilerplate 
clauses of bond contracts (which give creditors the ability to bring a defaulting sovereign 
before the courts in a creditor country), it was widely appreciated that no national authority 
would help the creditors enforce any judgment the court might make in the creditors’ 
favor.6  
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 The earlier “gunboat diplomacy” that was meant to be discouraged by the 1907 Hague “Convention 
Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts” did not die out 
until well after the first world war (see Suter and Stamm (1992) on the shifting power of creditors over 
sovereign debtors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). 
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The financial community responded to this lack of enforceability with proposals to 
voluntarily organize debtor/creditor relations in good times so as to build up a positive 
relationship that could be carried forward in bad times in order to cooperatively resolve a 
nascent debt crisis. The process would arrive at a solution that would perforce be one that 
the private sector would approve and the debtor would accept. As the approach would 
emphasize building confidence among the parties before a crisis erupted, it was thought it 
might help them move more rapidly together to an orderly debt restructuring if one became 
necessary. The promise of creditor confidence — one could almost say sympathy — even 
when economic conditions deteriorated severely also held out a possibility of interim 
private financing, at least rolled over inter-bank and trade credit lines. Whether this kind of 
voluntary process would also yield an adequate debt workout from the perspective of the 
long-run development of the country remained to be seen.  
An early version of this thinking had been outlined in the Rey Report, the same discussion 
by central bankers that had contained the CACs proposal, where the authors enumerated 
policies that they recommended the sovereign debtor, the private creditors and the official 
international institutions should follow (Group of Ten, 1996). In later variations of the 
voluntary approach, the recommended policies came to be collected into a proposed “code 
of good conduct,” although in final form they were named the “Principles for Stable 
Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets” (see Table 1). 
The terminology change from “code” to “principles” seems important. Principles are less 
definitive than a code might have been, as they express aspirations for behavior of the 
relevant players in order to reach specified goals, namely, “stable capital flows and fair 
debt restructuring.”  A “code of conduct” would have explicitly proscribed some behaviors 
and prescribed others. Countries or creditors that subscribed to such a code could be 
monitored and then criticized (if not also punished) for not following its stipulations. 
While the “Principles” are less than a code of conduct, they are as close to a code as the 
selected representatives of different classes of private financial institutions and sovereign 
debtors could come.  
The Principles will not substitute for involving the international public sector in one form 
or another, just as voluntary, private processes are nowhere deemed sufficient for corporate 
insolvencies and formal national bankruptcy regimes are deemed essential. We will return 
to this problem below, but let us first examine the Principles as currently formulated. 
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Table 1. A Chronology of Proposals to Guide Debtor/Creditor Relations 
in the Prevention and Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises 
A 
A key committee of developed country central bankers issues the “Rey Report” (see Group of 
Ten, 1996), which includes a “broad set of desirable principles and features” and singles out aims 
for each of the main actors in workouts from sovereign debt crises, namely, the international 
official community, private creditors and the sovereign debtor; 
B 
IMF extends its “lending into arrears” policy from bank loans to bonds in 1998, and in 1999 
introduces the “good faith” criterion to denote an appropriate debtor and private creditor effort 
to resolve a debt crisis, which is to serve as a condition for IMF to lend to a government although 
it may be accumulating arrears to its private creditors (see IMF, 1999); 
C 
The Group of Eight Summit in Cologne in June 1999 adopts the report of its Finance Ministers 
(see Group of Seven, 1999) on reforming the international financial architecture, including 
“Improving Crisis Prevention and Management and Involving the Private Sector,” which ends 
overall support for the policy of official bailouts of private creditors of developing countries; 
D 
The report of a private-creditor oriented working group of the Council on Foreign Relations (2000, 
pp. 4-6) includes 8 principles for a sovereign debtor and its private creditors to follow in bond 
restructuring that it suggests could be relevant to IMF’s “good faith” judgments; the IMF 
Executive Board discusses but does not endorse the proposal on January 24, 2001 (see IMF 2001, 
p. vii); 
E 
IMF’s ministerial level International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC)  in September 
2000 adopts the “Prague Framework” for international crisis prevention and resolution, including 
“greater private sector involvement,” giving additional impetus to rethinking the practices for 
sovereign debt workouts; 
F 
The Institute of International Finance (IIF) gives a financial industry response to the Prague 
Framework with “Principles for Private-Sector Involvement in Crisis Prevention and Resolution,” 
released in January 2001, outlining 9 principles for crisis prevention and cooperative crisis 
resolution; 
G 
IMF staff draft a set of “principles and procedures” for debtor/creditor dialogue under the “good 
faith” criterion (see IMF, 2002); the IMF Executive Board offers largely supportive comments, 
seeking to balance a need for “clarity” with “flexibility” as regards expectations of sovereign 
debtors and their creditors and as regards guidance for Fund lending into arrears (IMF, 2002a); 
H 
The Governor of the Banque de France, Jean-Claude Trichet, circulates “Towards a Code of Good 
Conduct on Sovereign Debt Re-Negotiation” in January 2003 (see Couillault 2003), suggesting 
specific “principles” and “best practices” and uniquely introducing the option of a mediator or 
arbitrator to facilitate the negotiated outcome; 
I 
The “Gang of 7,” a group of private financial sector organizations representing “buy-side,” “sell-
side” and bond traders, circulate a “Marketable bonds package” containing a draft “Code of 
Conduct for Emerging Markets” on January 31, 2003, a more creditor-friendly variant of the 
Trichet proposal; 
J 
The Group of 20 sets up a working group of four emerging economy member governments to 
work with the Gang of 7 to prepare a code; the draft “adopted” by a reduced set of the private 
players and the four countries becomes the “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt 
Restructuring.” The effort is “welcomed” as work in progress by the G-20 in November 2004 and 
IMFC takes note of it in April 2005. IIF begins to promote its adoption. 
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3. THE POLICY CONTENT OF THE PRINCIPLES 
As noted, although the roots of the Principles may be traced back to official initiatives, 
their driving force has been in the private financial sector, more specifically the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF), an organization driven mainly by the major internationally 
active commercial and investment banks.7 Not only did IIF lead — one might say, 
dominate — the effort among private sector organizations to develop the Principles, but it 
has also taken chief responsibility for marketing them and collecting statements of 
endorsement from leaders of private and official institutions (see IIF, 2006a). However, 
while senior officials of 30 debt-issuing countries are reported to have “voiced support” for 
the Principles (ibid., p. 3), none of their employing governments has formally committed to 
abide by them, including the four emerging economy countries in the Group of 20 (G-20) 
that cooperated with the private sector lawyers in drafting the text of the Principles (Brazil, 
Republic of Korea, Mexico and Turkey); nor have any private financial institutions 
pledged to follow the Principles. Indeed, they are explicitly non-binding: 
“Because individual cases will invariably involve different circumstances, 
the Principles should be applied flexibly on a case-by-case basis, and are 
strictly voluntary. Accordingly, no party is legally bound by any of the 
provisions of these Principles, whether as a matter of contract, comity, or 
otherwise. Moreover, nothing in these Principles (or in any party’s 
endorsement thereof) shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of any such 
party’s legal rights.” (IIF, 2005, p. 11) 
There are four main principles, each of which has two or more sub-principles. If they are 
followed, they are supposed to “promptly restore market confidence” in emerging market 
debtors whose policy actions or economic circumstances have begun to worry private 
creditors and thereby prevent “full-blown crises” from developing (IIF, 2006a, p. 2). The 
crisis prevention actions called for by the Principles are generally laudable, although 
somewhat asymmetric, as we will explain. The real difficulties are in the crisis resolution 
parts. It is not clear that all the creditors or the debtor would want to follow them under 
conditions of insolvency — and the escape clause in the Principles says they do not have to 
do so. 
3.1. Timely Transparency  
The first principle is “transparency and timely flow of information.”8 This is indeed an 
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important principle that has been promoted by both the private and official sectors for 
many years. Financial markets move quickly and may act on rumor and unwarranted 
investor hunches. The objective here is to “ensure through disclosure of relevant 
information that creditors are in a position to make informed assessments of [the debtor’s] 
economic and financial situation, including overall levels of indebtedness.” As we will see, 
however, there is an asymmetry in that no parallel effort is made to inform the debtor (or 
other creditors) of the situations or intentions of each of the different classes of private and 
official creditors with exposure to the debtor country. 
3.1.1. General Disclosure 
The Mexican crisis of 1994 provided the inspiration for the principle of government 
disclosure, as foreign holders of Mexican securities — not to mention official institutions, 
such as the IMF — discovered they had less timely or complete access to relevant 
information than desirable and less information than well-connected domestic investors.9 
Following the crisis, the IMF led an international effort, which included wide consultation 
with the creditor community and national and international statistical authorities, to define 
guidelines on macroeconomic and financial data dissemination. The outcome was the 
Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) for countries seeking to raise funds from 
international financial markets and the General Data Dissemination System (GDDS), 
which is meant for all IMF member countries and focuses on improving national statistical 
capacities (see IMF, 2003 and links therein).  
There is thus an official international framework on data dissemination. Moreover, once a 
country “subscribes” to the SDDS, the IMF deems observance of the standard to be 
mandatory. Also, the Fund (along with other institutions) provides technical assistance to 
countries seeking to adopt the standards and it monitors implementation as part of its 
Reviews of Standards and Codes. In this regard and at the general level, the Principles do 
no more than endorse practices that many countries are already pledged to follow.10 
This is welcomed, especially as the data at issue are made available to the public and thus 
all interested stakeholders can access them. In addition, however, requests have been made 
to increase the transparency of information from other sources. For example, the Argentine 
finance ministry called for greater transparency of internal reports of multilateral 
institutions, particularly the IMF, on its assessment of individual developing country debt 
structures.11 In fact, the Fund has increasingly made more information available on its debt 
sustainability analyses in its Article IV consultation reports for the countries that approve 
release of these reports. The Fund has also modified its standard assessments and sought to 
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 In this regard, it was found that domestic Mexican investors were disproportionately responsible for moving 
funds out of Mexico as the crisis erupted in 1994 (see Whitt, 1996, p. 15 and references cited therein). Also, 
IMF acknowledged it did not have sufficient information at hand at the time to appropriately monitor the 
situation (Fischer, 2001).  
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 IIF has developed standard data templates that go beyond the SDDS, but it has not yet published them 
(Khalid Sheikh, personal communication, October 2, 2007). If or when it decides to do so, it would be fitting 
to take the initiative to an appropriate international forum, such as the IMF, for a thorough vetting, revision 
and international endorsement, as in the original SDDS.  
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 The Argentine comments were prepared in the context of the G-20 discussions of the proposed Principles, 
in the drafting of which Argentina, a member of the G-20, had not been invited to participate (see Argentina, 
2004). 
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make them more accessible to non-specialist readers (see IMF, 2005). While it is not clear 
how IMF assessments will be used or how public they will be in a future debt 
renegotiation, the Principles make no reference to them; they address themselves only to 
sovereign debtors and their private creditors. Indeed, in this regard the Principles are less 
compelling than the proposals in the Rey Report of 1996 noted earlier, which addressed 
recommendations to relevant multilateral institutions as well as private creditors and 
sovereign debtors. 
3.1.2. Specific Disclosure 
In addition to the “general disclosure practice” that has been discussed thus far, the 
Principles call for an additional “specific disclosure practice” that potentially raises certain 
difficulties. That is, when the debtor’s situation requires a debt restructuring, the debtor 
government is asked to “disclose to all affected creditors maturity and interest rate 
structures of all external financial sovereign obligations, including the proposed treatment 
of such obligations.”  The first part of the “specific disclosure” principle is indeed required, 
as is a check for consistency between creditor claims and debtor records of its obligations. 
However, the second part of the disclosure principle seems to embody potential problems, 
as it could mean asking the debtor to reveal to its private creditors its prospective 
negotiating strategy with all creditors before a deal is concluded.  
The debtor government is asked to tell its private creditors “the central aspects, including 
assumptions, of its economic policies and programs.” Certainly publication of the 
government’s economic policies, “including assumptions,” is important to the population 
of any open society, and it is also essential in any “road show” to explain a proposed bond 
restructuring to investors.12 
The question is at what point in the restructuring process the information should be 
revealed. The Principles seem to ask the government to give privileged information to its 
private creditors during confidential discussions or negotiations (pre or post default) and 
before a prospective deal is on the table. Creditors are called upon to ensure 
“confidentiality of material non-public information.” Given the nature of the international 
financial markets today, it is hard to imagine such information remaining confidential for 
very long or that some bondholders or some other interested parties would be able to 
refrain from trading on that information. In addition, as the Argentine finance ministry 
noted, securities industry authorities that regulate some of the creditor institutions are 
likely to have their own disclosure requirements that are aimed to provide a level playing 
field to participants in their market, and thus some creditors would be prohibited from 
keeping the information confidential. In the Argentine view, “engaging in pre-default 
consultations with certain private creditors would necessarily entail the transferring of 
information…and it would generate asymmetric information benefiting certain market 
participants (Argentina, 2004, p. 3). 
There is a simple solution, which is to provide to all stakeholders whatever information is 
going to be provided to any of them. The Government of Belize applied it in its 2007 debt 
                                                 
12
 Creditors can, of course, choose not to accept a proposed restructuring for countries that do not present 
such information (appreciation to Shari Spiegel for this point). 
11 
restructuring: 
“Belize announced at the outset of its debt restructuring that it would adopt 
a completely transparent approach to the provision of information to 
creditors. All analyses of Belize’s economic position, its financial prospects 
and its debt servicing capacity — whether prepared by Belize itself, its 
financial advisors or the IMF — were posted on a publicly accessible 
website. Moreover, in what may have been a first in sovereign debt 
exchanges, Belize also posted on its website several indicative restructuring 
scenarios showing the extent of the debt relief that the government felt was 
needed.” (Buchheit and Karpinski, 2007, p. 279) 
While Belize posted everything, there was no comparable pressure on its creditors to post 
anything.13 Creditors are not asked in the Principles to reveal any information about their 
own situation that might affect their negotiating positions, for example regarding how 
many creditors of what type had hedged their exposure through credit default swaps. While 
it might be quite difficult even to collect such information under current reporting 
arrangements whenever there is a large and fluid universe of bondholders, sometimes the 
debtor finds it is negotiating with a small number of creditors and the asymmetry of 
information in the hands of the negotiators could easily be overcome.14  
A related complaint about creditor opacity was voiced by participants at the 2005 Multi-
Stakeholder Consultation on Sovereign Debt for Sustained Development, organized by the 
United Nations. In that discussion, one group of creditors, the national export credit 
agencies (primarily of developed countries), was called upon to be more forthcoming in 
providing information about their intentions as regards countries that enter into debt 
difficulties. As it is, “non-disclosure policies generally make it very difficult to understand 
[export credit agencies’] decision-making processes,” according to the report of the 
dialogue (see United Nations, 2005a, p. 8). 
In conclusion, one may wonder to what extent the selectivity in who receives government 
information in times of financial stress, the constraints on keeping such information 
confidential, and the asymmetry between the information to be provided by a government 
and by its creditors would deter governments from engaging in fully cooperative pre-crisis 
consultations, which is a stated central aim of the Principles. Indeed, regardless of senior 
management praise heaped on the Principles beforehand, would it not be incumbent on 
international banks without a permanent presence in the country to protect their 
shareholders by withdrawing funds from the country once they received confidential 
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Borrow,” unpublished manuscript, 2006). 
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information that a crisis was worsening? The creditors face no prospective penalties for 
being misleading or uncooperative in their consultations with the government. For them, it 
is a purely voluntary system. In other words, the absence of any obligation on any creditor 
to abide by the Principles, as noted above, might weaken a sovereign’s willingness to trust 
its creditor partners as it slid towards a financial crisis.  
3.2. Debtor-Creditor Dialogue 
The second Principle takes us into the form and content of “debtor-creditor dialogue and 
cooperation to avoid restructuring.” It has five sub-principles, but they actually amount to 
one: close dialogue in good times or bad. Dialogue in good times has been welcomed both 
in principle and practice. However, the expectation for what dialogue can accomplish 
during difficult times, e.g., in the face of a looming debt crisis, seem rather optimistic. It 
appears to hinge on the country being solvent, in which case the creditors would not need 
to take a haircut. As this is very hard to know in the midst of a crisis, the outcome of such 
consultations might be relatively more favorable to the creditors, who act on the 
presumption of solvency, than to the possibly insolvent debtor. We consider the two 
dialogues in turn.  
3.2.1. Dialogue in Good Times 
Dialogue in good times comprises sub-principles called “regular dialogue” and “best 
practices for investor relations,” plus a third sub-principle on country policy. The core 
proposal is to establish a formal mechanism through which a debtor government would 
routinely communicate with its creditors. Denoted an “investor relations program” (IRP), it 
would ideally be an identifiable government unit housed in either the central bank or 
ministry of finance. Activities of such a program would include “disseminating accurate 
and timely data/information through e-mail or investor relations websites; establishing 
formal channels of communication between policymakers and investors through bilateral 
meetings, investor teleconferences and videoconferences; and maintaining a 
comprehensive list of contact information for relevant market participants.” Creditors 
would be encouraged to use the IRP and “provide feedback on such information and data.”  
The IIF has been promoting IRPs for almost a decade, and the IMF has encouraged them 
as well (see IMF, 2004). The major emerging market borrowers that have overcome crises 
or periods of investor unease have especially felt the need to introduce IRPs to build 
investor confidence. Nevertheless, as of September 2006, only 10 of the 30 most active 
emerging market borrowers had established formal IRP offices (Brazil has two!).15 Other 
countries provide varying degrees of cooperation with creditors in the spirit of IRPs. One 
possible reason for not adopting full IRPs is cost. At least, representatives of some 
governments of small, middle-income economies, which did not envisage significant 
borrowing, “did not seem to put a high priority on spending significant amounts of 
financial resources on investor relations” (United Nations, 2005, p. 11). There are 
economies of scale in the effort, as for example in developing and maintaining a web site. 
It is a different matter if the intended audience is a few thousand or a few hundred 
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thousand. Regional cooperation might be a way to spread the costs, but it does not seem 
there has been any activity in this regard. Also, there has been only limited take up of an 
independent initiative to provide an information and communication web portal that would 
collect and disseminate investor-relevant information and provide a channel for two-way 
investor/government communication.16 
The major advantage of IRPs is to provide outreach to external investors who might find it 
difficult to stay fully informed about domestic developments in the borrowing country. 
Indeed, the IRP should provide a “public good” for the external investors as a group, 
opening up what would otherwise be individual private conversations of the government 
with its largest creditors, who send interlocutors to the debtor country to gather 
information for their clients (Herman, 2003, p. 206). The IRP also provides a means for 
investors to report back to the government their assessment of the information provided, 
which allows for a critique of the quality and timeliness of the information made available 
and thus pressure for their improvement. As long as the information made available 
through the IRP is also made available to the public at large — and no efforts are made to 
suppress information — the IRP would be providing a public service to all citizens of the 
country and should be applauded.  
There is a potential negative side of this dialogue issue, however, highlighted by the third 
sub-principle, called “policy action and feedback.” In this, debtor governments are called 
upon to implement “economic and financial policies, including structural measures, so as 
to ensure macroeconomic stability, [and] promote sustainable economic growth.” The 
problem is that there is often disagreement over which policies are best suited to achieve 
these laudable goals. The text of the principle continues that “political support for these 
measures” should be developed [emphasis added], and that governments “should closely 
monitor the effectiveness of policies, strengthen them as necessary, and seek investor 
feedback as warranted.”  
Government officials may take their advisors from wherever they please, including the 
foreign investor community. The difficulty comes if advice turns into pressure. In this 
case, consider that the goal of the investor in sovereign risk bonds is first and foremost to 
maintain the value of their securities, and the probability of being repaid. This provides 
only a limited overlap with the much broader goals of the government. For example, one 
may expect investors to be aware of the threat to political sustainability if a government 
squeezes the population excessively to maintain uninterrupted debt servicing.17 Yet there is 
a wide range of policies that enable governments to repay their debt and are politically 
sustained but are not necessarily best for the people of the country or the development of 
the economy (see Stiglitz et al., 2006). In any case, this is a matter for the domestic 
political process and not the foreign creditors to decide. In sum, if the views of foreign 
investors expressed through the IRP are simply added to the public policy discussion in a 
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 Nevertheless, the treatment of Indonesia in the 1997-98 crisis suggests that sometimes neither creditors, 
partner governments nor multilateral institutions adequately perceive the debtor government’s tipping point 
(assuming the destabilization of Indonesia was unintentional).  
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country, it seems that little harm would be done and possibly some good. One should not 
seek anything more. 
3.2.2. Dialogue in Troubled Times 
The strategy embodied in the principle of dialogue while conditions worsen is to avoid 
default, which would trigger complicated processes of negotiation (see next section). The 
two sub-principles that directly address this strategy are called “consultations” and 
“creditors’ support of debtor reform efforts.” The goal is to maintain continuous market 
access by building investor confidence and avoiding “misunderstanding about policy 
directions,” a nice turn of phrase to suggest the debtor government might want to think 
hard before disregarding the private financial sector’s policy prescriptions. As already 
noted, the private creditors and their shareholders do not have the same interests as public 
policy makers. The mandate of the private institutions is to protect creditor interests, both 
in terms of their own exposure to the country and more broadly in light of possible 
contagion that might disrupt the international market and their other exposures.  
Governments may or may not want to follow the creditors’ advice, but the Principles not 
only threaten them but also offer two financial “carrots” to do so. The first carrot is 
contained in the call on debtor governments to “consult with creditors to explore 
alternative market-based approaches to address debt-service problems before default 
occurs.”18 In other words, the creditors may offer the prospect of “re-profiling” repayment 
obligations through a voluntary swap of old bonds for new ones with later repayments. For 
this to work, the leading international investment banks and other participants in the 
dialogue would need to encourage existing bondholders to join the swap, expressing 
confidence in the soundness of the policies being followed and the view that the country 
was having a liquidity problem and not an insolvency crisis.  
One should be clear, however, on what is being offered. The voluntary swap-as-solution 
depends on the assumption that a decline in market confidence that makes the swap 
necessary is not actually warranted and that a concerted creditor effort would help avoid an 
unnecessary default. For example, if a bulge in payments was falling due and if market 
confidence in the country were high enough, the government would be able to raise the 
funds in the normal way (at normal interest rates) to handle its debt-servicing bulge. But 
once confidence has slipped, a collective creditor approach would need to be substituted in 
a special — albeit voluntary and market-based — arrangement. The new bonds would 
presumably have to carry an interest rate that reflected creditor concerns about their 
recovery value and the swap into the new bonds would also presumably earn significant 
fee income for the investment banks arranging it. In fact, cases often cited as examples of 
cooperative debt swaps in the sense promised by the Principles, such as Uruguay in 2003 
and the Dominican Republic in 2005, have proved quite good deals for the creditors (see 
Spiegel, 2008), while it is less clear they have addressed the countries’ debt sustainability 
and development needs. 
The second financial “carrot” is an offer to help keep sovereign debt concerns from 
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mushrooming into a wholesale domestic financial crisis. In this case, the offer is that “the 
creditor community should consider, to the extent consistent with their business objectives 
and legal obligations, appropriate requests for the voluntary, temporary maintenance of 
trade and inter-bank advances and/or the rollover of short-term maturities on public and 
private sector obligations....” This offer would apply not to thousands of dispersed bond 
investors but a limited number of international commercial banks.  
Most of the credits and credit lines that would be kept open are made by private lenders to 
private borrowers, mostly banks, although there are instances in which foreign banks lend 
short term to the government or under government-guarantee. In many cases, foreign banks 
would not cut their short-term credit lines to local banks as a consequence of a sovereign 
debt crisis per se. However, they might do so if the local banks held large amounts of 
sovereign debt whose viability had been put into question, which is not uncommon. 
Foreign banks might also come to worry if the sovereign debt crisis embodied a loss of 
confidence in the overall economy, capital flight and a run-down of foreign exchange 
reserves, i.e., a broader financial and balance-of-payments crisis (as in the 1990s Mexican 
and Russian cases). Whatever might be scaring the suppliers of foreign short-term credit 
lines, pulling them would assuredly be devastating for the economy and thus for the debt-
servicing capacity of the government. None of this would be good for the recovery value of 
the medium-term government debt.  
In this regard, the offer in the Principles to maintain the lines while the government 
undertakes confidence-building measures may be understood as in the interest of the 
creditors as well as the government. It also gives the creditors a weapon, as they could 
threaten to withdraw the credit lines and punish the people and the economy if the 
government were not sufficiently sympathetic to the creditors’ views on the preferred 
macroeconomic policies or the terms of a re-profiling bond swap. But while all the 
creditors might benefit from this stance, bondholders as well as other creditors, only banks 
are potentially promising to maintain credit lines and they can only be assumed to act in 
their own interest. Indeed, even if the banks made a convincing case that they could be 
relied upon to promote the public interest in the debt-crisis country, let alone the broad 
creditor interest, the history of international commercial bank finance during crises does 
not inspire confidence that they would do so. As we have observed before, banks are not 
governments. Those commercial banks with physical presence in the domestic financial 
sector may well find it expedient to maintain their short-term credit lines, whether or not 
the government follows the bankers’ preferred policy options. Others would not. As a 
general proposition, the debtor government should probably take less comfort from the 
carefully circumscribed promise in the Principles to maintain credit lines than from the 
strong pressure that might be put on those banks to do so by their home governments if the 
debtor government is cooperating with the IMF.19  
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Indeed, it is curious that the IMF is omitted from the cooperative dialogue discussion in the 
Principles. Linking financial support to policy change is what the IMF does under an 
international mandate. In other words, one may see the Principles as offering a private 
version of an IMF policy dialogue and Stand-by Arrangement with the government, albeit 
with less promise of new financial resources than the IMF sometimes puts on the table. 
It is understandable that the creditors might want to supplant the IMF, especially after the 
Fund began its “private sector involvement” policy and became a less reliable friend of 
creditor interests. As market commentators were fond of saying at the time, the Fund is a 
“political institution.” Indeed, it is hard to believe the Fund is any less susceptible to 
political pressures under the new policy than when it defended private creditor interests 
more assiduously.   
For all the criticisms made of the IMF — which have been louder and longer from those 
speaking in the name of the poor who are most hurt during adjustment programs than from 
the creditors — it is a little surprising to think the government might prefer to work 
directly with its private creditors instead of the Fund. Perhaps the authors of the Principles 
thought that the government might want to discuss its adjustment needs with its creditors 
before discussing them with the Fund. Creditor representatives would be available for such 
discussion, as there is meant to be continuous dialogue between the private creditors and 
the government through the IRP. In any event, one should expect the creditors to defer to 
any adjustment program that the government might develop in a policy dialogue with the 
Fund staff, especially after it was endorsed by the Fund’s Executive Board. It is perhaps an 
oversight, but the Principles are silent on the relationship of the creditor dialogue and that 
with IMF, let alone with intergovernmental alternatives to the IMF that might emerge from 
recent bilateral or regional initiatives, as in East Asia and South America. 
3.3. Good Faith Debt Renegotiation 
The policy dialogue and private financial cooperation discussed above is viewed as taking 
place before the government defaults on any of its obligations to creditors. Those cases 
presume the problem is one of illiquidity, not insolvency; i.e., that the government would 
be able to meet its obligations over the long run if it could only get over the temporary loss 
of confidence and return to normal access to credit. The third Principle addresses outright 
debt renegotiation, and thus cases that are more likely to reflect insolvency. In these cases, 
whether or not the government actually defaults, its payment obligations have become 
unsustainable and a debt restructuring process has to be set in motion.  
The Principle to handle this situation is called “good faith actions,” and the phrase “good 
faith” is not accidental. As noted earlier, that is how the IMF names the criterion it uses to 
                                                                                                                                                    
repayments brought a temporary roll over in January 1998, giving time to negotiate a medium-term 
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pp. 33-34).  
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denote acceptable debtor government and creditor cooperation to resolve a debt crisis.20  
The good-faith negotiations Principle contains five sub-principles which together describe 
how a debt restructuring negotiation should be undertaken. They may be separated into 
policy aims and actions that the debtor and its creditors should embrace, and how the 
negotiations should be carried out. 
3.3.1. Policy Aims and Actions 
The underlying thesis is that the debtor and its creditors can and should cooperate in 
seeking an effective debt workout, i.e., that they should adopt a “voluntary, good faith 
process,” which is the name of the first sub-principle. Under such a cooperative process, 
the government would adopt “sound policies” that seek “to establish conditions for 
renewed market access on a timely basis, viable macroeconomic growth, and balance-of-
payments sustainability in the medium term.” The debtor and its creditors should identify 
“the best means for placing the country on a sustainable balance-of-payments path, while 
also preserving and protecting asset values during the restructuring process” (the “asset 
values” are, of course, the creditors’ assets, which is to say the debtor’s liabilities).  
However, as the Argentine finance ministry reminds us, there may be an inconsistency 
between “protecting asset values during the restructuring process” and “viable 
macroeconomic growth and balance-of-payments sustainability in the medium term.” As 
they emphasize, “There can be no good faith negotiations if the final result is not a 
sustainable debt structure,” i.e., Argentina includes in its definition of “good faith” that the 
aim of the restructuring should be to leave the country with significant growth — and thus 
debt-servicing — prospects (Argentina, 2004, p. 5). In the Rey Report in 1996, the central 
bankers listed among their 11 recommended principles and features of a sovereign workout 
process that it “should support credible and sustainable actions and, to this end, not impose 
excessive social, political, or economic costs on the debtor” (Group of Ten, 1996, p. 2).21 
Unfortunately, this was not included in the Principles. 
A related set of sub-principles speaks to debt servicing during the restructuring process. 
The primary concern expressed is that creditors be paid: “Debtors should resume, to the 
extent feasible, partial debt service as a sign of good faith and resume full payment of 
principal and interest as conditions allow.” There is no acknowledgement, however, that 
the government might need to weigh signaling “good faith” to its creditors versus to its 
own population, whose essential public services would likely have been cut back by the 
crisis. Governments are also expected to make sure that trade lines are fully serviced 
during the restructuring period, a point discussed earlier; i.e., sufficient foreign exchange 
should be made available to the banking system for this purpose. As also noted earlier, the 
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economic cost of the withdrawal of trade credit lines makes this essential, so this much is 
likely a priority already shared by the government.  
Further under the heading of actions during restructuring, the Principles say that 
governments “should avoid additional exchange controls on outflows, except for 
temporary periods in exceptional circumstances.” The exceptional circumstances 
qualification is a welcome vindication of the Malaysian policy during its 1990s crisis, one 
that the IMF now shares (see IMF 2005a, p. 46). Indeed, it is increasingly appreciated that 
open capital markets lead to excessive volatility without adding to growth, and recent 
research suggests that capital account regulation can be a useful tool in macroeconomic 
policy (e.g., see Stiglitz et al., 2006).  One may thus ask whose interest is being protected 
by generally discouraging exchange controls, in particular on short-term flows. It seems 
less an imperative for medium-term creditors than for the international banking and 
securities trading industries.22 Indeed, even after investor panic subsides, exchange 
controls might help shelter the government’s access to foreign exchange from renewed 
speculative outflows and thus advance resumption of the servicing of the bonds and other 
long-term sovereign loans that the Principles emphasize. The question of whether to 
maintain controls or not, to set them on inflows or outflows, rely on administrative 
restrictions or financial deterrents, all seem best determined after the country is assuredly 
on its path to recovery. 
The final category of policy aims discussed under the Principle of good faith action is 
labeled “sanctity of contracts.” The word “sanctity” is certainly evocative, as it derives 
from the Latin word for holy. Aside from saintliness or purity, the dictionary will tell you 
the word also carries meanings of sacredness, inviolability and binding force. Here the 
focus is entirely on creditor rights to repayment that are embodied in the covenants of bond 
contracts (or bank loans). “Sanctity” is asserted “to ensure the integrity of the negotiating 
and restructuring process,” which is to say it aims to maintain creditor belief that their 
claims will be protected to the maximum extent possible even in the face of insolvency. 
The Principles are very clear: “contractual rights must remain fully enforceable.” This is a 
point on which creditors would insist and that governments wanting continued access to 
private finance could not do otherwise than acknowledge in signing a bond contract.  
The rights at issue here include the ability of individual creditors to take the debtor to court 
and seek enforcement of repayment terms (although bonds issued under the new CACs 
introduce some constraints on individual bondholder rights). However, while sovereign 
debtors need to be careful what commercial assets they leave exposed to capture by 
disaffected foreign creditors, it does not mean that gunboats will be dispatched to collect 
for those creditors that decide not to participate in a debt workout arrangement. Creditor 
rights may be sanctified, but that does not mean they trump all other rights or that they are 
enforceable against a sovereign. 
In the face of a looming insolvency, the authors of the Principles remember the IMF and 
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seek its help to “support the debtor’s reasonable efforts to avoid default.” Indeed, the word 
“reasonable” is essential here. One can posit ethical reasons — ones that a “reasonable” 
person might find compelling — to override contract “sanctity” and unilaterally suspend 
payment (see Herman, 2007). Any judge hearing a creditor complaint against a developing 
country government that defaults could well do with some explicit international guidance 
as to when it might be deemed justified. The Principles do not help us here.  
In sum, the propositions asserted by the Principles on debt renegotiation policy represent 
the private creditors’ perspective. But sovereign debt workouts also have social and 
economic imperatives. The sovereign should seek sufficient overall relief to return to 
adequate growth of per capita income, employment, poverty reduction and financial 
sustainability and do so sooner rather than later. In the past, the IMF has had a lead role in 
setting the overall financing “envelope” that it deemed warranted by the country’s 
situation, within which some split between debt relief and “new money” would need to be 
negotiated among the relevant parties. One can argue whether or not the IMF 
systematically underestimated how much net financing would be needed in past debt-
crises, but one can hope that in the future a reformed international monetary organization, 
governed differently than IMF is today, would set the envelope adequately so that 
governments in need would be attracted to cooperate with the Fund and not come only out 
of desperation. How much “violence” is then done to sovereign debt contracts with private 
creditors will depend on where that overall financing envelope is set, how it gets divided 
between new funds and debt relief, and how well the different classes of creditors are able 
to advance their claims within that process. In this regard, a comprehensive or coherence-
ensuring sovereign debt restructuring approach is important. This author cannot find it in 
the Principles.  
3.3.2. Arranging the Negotiations 
According to the Principles, while “the appropriate format and role of negotiation 
vehicles…should be determined flexibly and on a case-by-case basis,” the first negotiation 
sub-principle is about forming “creditor committees.” If a group of creditors should start to 
form such a committee, the Principles say that “both creditors and the debtor should 
cooperate in its establishment.” As has been the case since the nineteenth century, large 
financial firms representing the major creditors of a debt crisis country could come 
together to deal with a country’s defaulted debt. In the Argentine case, however, 
committees of small creditors also formed (e.g., German small-scale bondholders23). These 
were obviously not the primary creditor interlocutors of Argentina — however, neither was 
the committee of large bondholders (see Porzecanski, 2005, pp. 323-326). One should not 
assume, in other words, that a creditor committee will easily be formed to represent the 
wide range of different bondholders, often with disparate goals. Indeed, it has not been the 
usual way in the recent decade or so of bond debt restructuring cases. Nevertheless, it is the 
preferred option in the Principles.  
If the private creditors of a distressed sovereign do form themselves into a single creditor 
committee, they would have to sort out among themselves who would serve as the 
principal leaders and actual participants in the envisaged negotiations. To the degree that 
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major creditors from different communities had already been brought together under an 
IRP during “good times,” there could be a nascent network of individuals from among 
which the creditors’ committee could be formed. Moreover, CACs for individual bond 
issues would specify how the interests of those bondholders should be represented and the 
appointed agent would presumably serve on the creditor committee.  
In fact, representativeness has been a concern in recent efforts to form such committees. In 
some cases, IIF reports, legal advisors of debtor governments have requested that proposed 
members of creditor committees secure proof that they actually represent other creditors. 
Requesting such proof could be a useful tactic if the government did not want a particular 
individual to sit across the table at the negotiations. However, except for a small number of 
cases in which a group of fund managers and other creditors have appointed a 
representative to act on their behalf (and in future when formal agents could be chosen to 
restructure bonds under CACs), committee members apparently do not “represent” other 
creditors but reflect “the views of the creditor community during the negotiations with a 
view toward attracting a critical mass of support for negotiated restructuring terms” (IIF 
2007, p. 12 and IIF, 2006, [no page number]). The difficult question for a world with 
highly dispersed holders of the bonds of major debtor countries is whether self-appointed 
committee members would in fact be accepted by a working majority of creditors as 
adequately reflecting their interests.24 Indeed, in its recently issued “Best Practices for 
Formation and Operation of Creditor Committees,” the IIF Principles Consultative Group 
(see below) acknowledges that the “committee must have credibility with the debtor and be 
able to signal that it has influence with a critical mass of all creditors and investors” (IIF, 
2007, p. 13).  
The Principles envisage that the creditor committee would function much like the “London 
Clubs” that negotiated restructurings of international commercial bank debt in the 1980s. 
That is, the creditor committee should be “a forum for the debtor to present its economic 
program and financing proposals; collect and analyze economic data; gather, evaluate, and 
disseminate creditor input on financing proposals; and generally act as a communication 
link between the debtor and the creditor community.” The committee is also expected to 
“coordinate across affected instruments and with other affected creditor classes, with a 
view to form a single committee.”  
There are reasons to think, however, that this last expectation would be difficult to arrange. 
The institutional differences between banks and bondholders suggest that each group might 
prefer to talk separately with the government. Indeed, it is still typical for bank credits to 
be renegotiated in “London clubs” and bonds to be addressed by government bond 
exchange offers. But it can easily get much more complicated. In the 2005-6 Iraqi debt 
restructuring, separate creditor committees formed for “commercial banks, trade suppliers, 
North African trade suppliers, Asian construction companies, and so forth” (Buchheit and 
Karpinski, 2007, p. 279).  
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 Not every bondholder would have to accept the committee’s legitimacy, but a large enough share of 
bondholders would have to feel their interests were adequately represented so the committee’s proposal could 
win a restructuring vote (as under the CACs) or effectively “cram down” the new arrangement over the 
objections of a recalcitrant minority of bondholders, as through votes by an effective majority to negatively 
modify old bonds as investors swapped into new ones (“exit consents”). 
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Certainly, one may doubt that the “single committee” would include the bilateral official 
creditors that usually work through the Paris Club (unless the Club led it). The SDRM 
experience, noted earlier, is especially discouraging on this score.25 Members of the Paris 
Club have bound themselves into elaborate and specific rules for treating problem debt and 
would be extremely reluctant to instead join another process that works on different 
principles (see Cosío-Pascal, 2008).  
Whatever the scope of the creditor committee, to be able to operate it has to address certain 
difficulties, including resolving a point noted in the transparency discussion above 
concerning “material non-public information.” While the Principles contain no elaboration 
on this point, the IMF considered it in its 2002 paper on “good faith” actions (IMF, 2002, 
p. 14). The IMF observed that a negotiation necessarily entails offers and counter-offers 
and it is of their essence that they be held confidential during the negotiation process. The 
Fund noted that the temptation for a creditor to trade on the information would be very 
high and so proposed that not bondholders but professional advisors sworn to maintain 
confidentiality should negotiate on behalf of the bondholders.26 The Fund also proposed 
that in a complex restructuring the debtor and the committee might jointly appoint a 
mediator to facilitate the negotiations (ibid., p. 12). While that proposal has also been made 
by private sector, civil society and official authors, the Principles are silent on whether it 
should be encouraged or even considered potentially useful.27  
A further challenge that a creditor committee has to meet if it is to negotiate on behalf of 
all its members is to forge a single, common negotiating strategy. This means it would 
have to find the common ground among diverse interests, as between original “buy and 
hold” bondholders, bondholders that maintain a portfolio of emerging market bonds but 
regularly “churn”, repackage, or hedge them and modify their effective exposure (e.g., 
strip them into parts with different risk characteristics, offsetting some of the parts with 
credit default and other derivatives), and speculative investors who buy distressed bonds at 
a small fraction of face value to profit on the rise in price following the debt workout.  
Owing to how difficult this is in practice, one may envisage the bondholders’ committee 
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 That is, IMF staff had proposed including governments as one of the classes of creditors under the SDRM. 
Private creditors saw the value of this approach, but the official creditors would have none of it (see Hagan, 
2005, pp. 352-354). 
26
 The IIF “Best Practices” for creditor committees noted earlier comes to essentially the same conclusion: 
“In order to facilitate participation by hedge funds and asset managers who may face conflicts of interest 
when they come into contact with material non-public information…, an external representative could be 
appointed… (IIF, 2007, p. 13). 
27
 One additional concern in the Principles might be mentioned here, namely, that the debtor should pay the 
“reasonable costs of a single creditor committee” and that the creditors and debtor should jointly decide what 
constitutes reasonable costs. This was the practice in the 1980s bank debt restructurings and is the corporate 
practice as well. It is probably inevitable that the debtor formally covers this charge, both for reasons of 
precedence and as otherwise many creditors might refuse to be represented by the creditor committee and 
seek individual redress in the courts. Politically, it may pose certain difficulties for the government; however, 
the charges are fungible and could be factored into the final terms of the “haircut.” Curiously, especially as 
this was a contentious matter in the inter-creditor negotiations of the text of the Principles, there is no 
mention of sharing the committee’s operating costs with the debtor in the new “Best Practices” for creditor 
committees. Instead, creditor committee members are called on to share responsibilities among themselves 
for providing facilities and staff, and for handling communications (IIF, 2007, p. 14). 
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meeting with the government not for negotiation but consultation. Discussions would not 
need to take the form of offer and counter offer. The government could instead try to judge 
from an informal dialogue what kind of bond exchange offer would likely attract sufficient 
participation to make the swap a success. In fact, this is how it has been done. The 
government meets with various bondholder groups (if there is more than one committee) 
and/or major bondholders prior to making a formal offering to swap old bonds for new 
ones with terms believed to be acceptable to the bondholders. When creditors are happy 
with the outcome, they call it a case of “debtor-creditor cooperation,” as in the Dominican 
Republic (IIF, 2006, no page numbers). When they are not happy with the outcome, they 
call it “uncooperative” and a “unilateral exchange offer,” as in Argentina (Porzecanski, 
2005, p. 323).  
This is not to say that single creditor committees are always impractical. The IIF cites the 
handling of the debt difficulties of Grenada in 2005 as a case of a creditor committee that 
functioned successfully (IIF, 2006, box 1). Grenada needed relief because in 2004 
Hurricane Ivan devastated the island, destroying or severely damaging nearly 90 percent of 
its housing stock (Buchheit and Karpinski, 2006, p. 227). Perhaps this sudden catastrophe 
plus the fact that Grenada had been well regarded in international markets up until the 
hurricane help explain the willingness of creditors in this case to expeditiously work 
through a creditor committee. Grenada is also a small debtor: the hurricane had forced it to 
miss interest payments on two international issues that were held by a limited number of 
bondholders but comprised the bulk of its external commercial debt of less than $178 
million.  
Moreover, despite an unprecedented effort of the government of another small country, 
Belize, to encourage formation of such a committee a year later, one “did not coalesce” 
and the government instead had to consult with its creditors “individually and in groups” 
(Buchheit and Karpinski, 2007, p. 279). While having a committee would have had certain 
advantages, not having one did not seem to impede the restructuring, which was accepted 
by 98.1 percent of bondholders (ibid.). But again, this was a relatively simple case, with a 
small number of securities to restructure.  
The potential advantage of a creditor committee seems far more compelling for big debt 
crisis cases, albeit more difficult to organize given that it has to be done on a purely 
voluntary basis under current arrangements. Rather, some means to push the different 
classes of creditors into workable groups for discussion, if not negotiation, seems a 
practical necessity. The weakness of the Principles is that as a voluntary mechanism it 
lacks a way to bring this about. It does not substitute for the “carrots and sticks” of a 
bankruptcy regime. 
3.4. Fair Treatment (of Creditors) 
The last main Principle involves a relatively short text that calls for “fair treatment,” 
although the only concerns expressed are that creditors be treated fairly. Indeed, the first 
sub-principle is a call to avoid “unfair discrimination among affected creditors.” This begs 
the question of what is unfair discrimination. 
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There is a delicate point in this, which is that formally, there is no specified priority for 
repayment in sovereign risk lending, although the informal convention is to accord first 
priority to the IMF and the multilateral banks. Moreover, the government creditors that 
cooperate through the Paris Club generally demand and receive preferential treatment over 
private creditors in debt restructuring in the sense that the governments usually do not 
accept to take any “haircut” in restructuring their claims on a middle-income country.28 
Paris Club creditors also routinely demand “comparable treatment” by private creditors to 
their own offer of relief, by which they really mean that private creditors should receive no 
better treatment from the debtor than the official creditors. “Worse treatment” — deeper 
debt relief — is perfectly acceptable. In addition, sovereign governments may choose to 
actually treat different classes of private creditors differently, depending on their national 
economic and financial needs (see Gelpern, 2004). Argentina, for example, defaulted on its 
bonds and certain other liabilities, but not on the “guaranteed loans” issued just before the 
default, many of which were held by domestic pension funds and insurance companies (see 
Damill et al., 2006). Given the economic shock of the crisis to the financial system, as 
already noted, this was understandable. 
The Argentine finance ministry raised an additional challenging point regarding “fair 
treatment” of creditors. In this view, the Principles missed an opportunity made salient by 
the thousands of European households, especially in Germany and Italy, who claimed they 
were misled by “certain placing institutions” that sold them financial instruments that were 
“unsuitable” for them and whose risks they did not understand (Argentina, 2004, p. 6). As 
the ministry stated, “It is not equitable to treat equally unsophisticated retail investors and 
large institutional investors.” Besides giving preferential treatment to the household 
investors, they also suggested giving preferential treatment to “original” purchasers, “the 
ones that purchased the debt instruments at face value.” Lastly, they suggested giving 
“differential and less preferred treatment to those bondholders who purchased their 
securities after open default situations” (ibid., p. 11). One may imagine different views on 
Wall Street, especially from the “bottom fishers,” who would argue that they’re being 
compensated for providing liquidity when no one else is willing to do so. However one 
judges the ethics of that claim, it certainly raises the issue of fairness as it might have been 
explicitly considered in a set of principles. 
Finally, if the authors had wanted to make the Principles more balanced, they might have 
added another point to this section. That is, the Principles could have called for creditor 
restraint in seeking redress through the courts while a cooperative debt workout process 
was underway. This is already part of the IMF “good faith” criterion as considered by the 
Fund’s Executive Directors in 2002. Their expectation at that time was that when a “formal 
negotiating framework” (e.g., a creditor committee) is utilized, then good faith negotiations 
would include, inter alia, “the agreement to a standstill on litigation during the 
restructuring process by creditors represented in the committee” (IMF, 2002a).29 This 
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 Only very low-income countries (HIPCs) or politically important cases or unusual cases under what is 
called the Evian Approach would potentially qualify for any of the non-standard terms (see Cosío-Pascal, 
2008). 
29
 The complication here is that many individual bondholders that are perforce “represented” by virtue of 
being in the group of defaulted creditors might not quietly agree to be led by the committee, but instead exit 
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would have been somewhat comparable to a “standstill” in a corporate bankruptcy process. 
However, in the Principles it would have been a moral pledge not a court ordered 
requirement; indeed, it would have been a pledge on which no one endorsing the Principles 
could have been held to account given the disclaimer with which the Principles began. 
Even so, this point was apparently too controversial for a private-sector led initiative. 
                                                                                                                                                    
by dumping their bonds at whatever price or seek individual redress in the courts, as was the experience with 
the ineffective Global Committee of Argentine Bondholders (see Gelpern, 2005). 
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4. LUKEWARM RECEPTION AND FOLLOW UP 
Once the Principles were released, it became clear they represented a consensus among 
only a limited range of players. The proponents of the Principles in the international 
financial industry have been trying, nevertheless, to spread their acceptance to other parts 
of the industry and to governments, if with limited success.  
4.1. The Official and Private Sector Reception 
In the international official sector, the Principles were welcomed, but only as a work in 
progress. The G-20 finance ministers and central bank governors, meeting in Berlin under 
the chairmanship of Germany, included the following in their communiqué of November 
21, 2004: 
“…we welcomed the results achieved between issuing countries and 
private-sector participants on ‘Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair 
Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets.’ Such principles, which we 
generally support, provide a good basis for strengthening crisis prevention 
and enhancing predictability of crisis management now, and as they further 
develop in future” (paragraph 8, emphasis added). 
One may read this as a warm statement of appreciation for the private-sector leadership of 
IIF (whose chair, Josef Ackermann, was also the chair of Deutsche Bank), and 
encouragement to keep working.  Perhaps a crisper reflection of government views on the 
Principles was given by the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) of 
the IMF, also at the level of finance ministers and central bank governors, but representing 
global constituencies, which took note of the Principles (a weak degree of endorsement) at 
its meeting in Washington, D.C. on April 24, 2005: 
“[IMFC] notes the ‘Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt 
Restructuring in Emerging Markets’ being developed by a number of 
sovereign issuers and the investor community, and encourages further 
efforts to improve the Principles aimed at achieving a broad consensus” 
(paragraph 17, emphasis added). 
The next annual meeting of the G-20 ministers took place in Beijing on October 16, 2005. 
That meeting’s communiqué was somewhat less enthusiastic than its previous statement in 
2004 had been:  
“We welcome the efforts by borrowing countries and private-sector 
creditors to broaden the consensus on the Principles for Stable Capital 
Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets…” (paragraph 10). 
Not only did the official sector only tentatively embrace the Principles, but the private 
sector split into “sell-side” support and “buy-side” opposition. In fact, seven private sector 
associations had together produced a draft “code of conduct” in January 2003 (see again 
table 1) and that group continued to work together until August 2004 on preparing the 
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Principles in cooperation with the four emerging economy members of the G-20 noted 
earlier. Five of the seven private associations, however, left (or were “kicked out,” 
depending on whom you ask): EMTA (the Emerging Market Traders Association), the 
Bond Market Association, the Securities Industry Association, the International Securities 
Market Association, and EMCA (the Emerging Market Creditors Association). They 
represented institutions that operate in the markets that trade these securities and bond 
investors who hold them. Thus, the Principles that emerged represented the views only of 
IIF, joined by the International Primary Market Association.30  
The financial press coverage of the launch highlighted these problems. In a detailed 
account of the substantive and process difficulties in preparation of the Principles, 
Euromoney focused on the role of Charles Dallara, Managing Director of IIF, who had 
been the driving force behind them (and for completing them in time for inclusion in the 
Berlin G-20 meeting). Dallara was reported to be pleased by the “breadth of private 
financial sector support” for the Principles, citing the over 300 members of IIF, although 
the reporter wondered about “the extent of the rank and file’s enthusiasm.” He noted that 
not a single bondholding institution spoke at the IIF launch and that while Euromoney had 
spoken to a large number of bondholders, all of them “either actively opposed the 
principles, refused to endorse them, or were too busy to pay much attention to what was 
going on” (Salmon, 2004). Even though the Principles seem highly skewed toward creditor 
interests, they apparently did not go far enough for the “buy side,” who read them as 
having weaker protection of creditor interests than the 2003 Draft “Code of Conduct for 
Emerging Markets” of the Gang of 7 (see table 1). 
The “buy side” has for the most part remained publicly silent on its reservations, although 
one group, the Global Committee of Argentine Bondholders (GCAB), issued a press 
release on December 2, 2004, explaining its concerns. After welcoming the progress that 
the Principles represented and announcing support for “most of the tenets laid out in this 
document,” it called for “some clarification on issues relating to debtor and creditor 
behavior in the event of a debt restructuring.”31 The GCAB offered to be constructive in 
helping “to provide clarity on these outstanding issues and then to endorse the [revised?] 
Principles and promote their widespread adoption.”  
In short, while the analysis of this paper finds the Principles biased strongly toward 
creditor interests, the “buy side” found them to be weakening their interests. This is a 
dilemma that a purely voluntary mechanism cannot resolve. 
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 To be fair, at least some of the buy-side concerns that were unaddressed at the time of their departure 
appear to have eventually been included in some form in the text of the Principles. 
31
 In particular, the GCAB expressed concern that nothing was said in the Principles to curb “aggressive use 
of exit consents,” a mechanism by which a sovereign debtor can legally disarm a recalcitrant minority of 
bondholders when the majority is ready to accept a restructuring agreement. It also sought greater support for 
having the debtor reimburse the creditors for the legitimate expenses of the creditor committee, a point noted 
in an earlier footnote above (see http://www.tfargentina.it/download/GCAB%20-%20Press%20Release%20-
%202-12-04.pdf).  
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4.2. Follow Up on Principles Implementation 
Rather than seek to modify the newly minted Principles in the face of the criticism, IIF 
took ownership of them, and has promoted them to countries and financial institutions. It 
also speaks up on behalf of them to the intergovernmental community. To actively 
encourage implementation of the Principles, IIF has convoked two high-level committees. 
One is the Principles Consultative Group, which in 2006 comprised 7 senior finance 
officials from emerging economy governments (Brazil, China, Republic of Korea, Mexico, 
Russian Federation, South Africa and Turkey) and 10 senior private sector executives from 
commercial and investment banks, investment managers and advisors, and one large 
pension fund that also issues mutual funds (staff of IMF and the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York participate as observers). This is the more active of the two committees, as it 
reviews and evaluates the progress of individual emerging economy governments in 
implementing the Principles and offers suggestions for improvement.  
The other committee is the Group of Trustees for the Principles, which in 2006 included 28 
international leaders, who mostly came from the emerging markets finance sector (3 
individuals served on both committees). Ten of the 28 trustees held ministerial rank or 
equivalent in emerging economy governments, and an additional 3 from the private 
financial sector first became prominent for their service in such governments. In addition 
to the issuers of sovereign bonds, private sector representation was weighted, as for the 
Principles Consultative Group, toward the “sell side,” although again with the one 
pension/mutual fund company represented. Also, while only one member held an official 
position in a developed economy, 6 others in the private sector from developed countries 
were well known for their past government or international financial organization 
service.32 The Trustees are thus the more senior group and they are empowered to propose 
modifications in the Principles, as well as review their implementation and the evolution of 
the international financial system (IIF, 2006a, p. 7).  
The first meeting of the Trustees took place in Singapore on September 16, 2006, when 
they received a report by the Principles Consultative Group on its activities over the year 
then just past. As the meeting took place in the shadow of the IMF Annual Meeting in 
Singapore, one is tempted to see the Trustees as a largely private-sector parallel to the IMF 
Board of Governors and the other group as a parallel to the IMF Board of Executive 
Directors. IIF serves as the secretariat of the Principles Consultative Group, preparing 
country reports on data transparency and investor relations, as well as on country policies 
for the Group’s consideration. The Group then reflects on the reports and asks “IIF 
management to relay the Group’s perspectives to country authorities and engage in 
dialogue toward implementation of [Group] recommendations” (IIF, 2006a, p. 9).   
The IIF has thus set in motion an institutional mechanism to promote adoption of the 
Principles. In this regard, it may well succeed especially in building momentum to expand 
the extent and effectiveness of what we called here “dialogue in good times.” This is not to 
be minimized. It appears that the spirit of the Principles was also visible in the Grenada 
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 Full membership of both groups is listed in IIF (2006a). Both groups were reported as slightly larger in the 
2007 report, with comparable proportions from official and private sectors (see IIF, 2007). 
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and Belize restructuring deals noted earlier. However, it is hard to imagine similar success 
with larger debtors that face difficult economic situations in a more contentious domestic 
political landscape.  
Indeed, in the corporate sector, when workouts are arranged voluntarily among the relevant 
parties, the official bankruptcy regime is just behind the curtain, giving implicit guidance 
on the directions in which the workout needs to go. If the parties in a sovereign workout 
had recourse to such a regime, the prospects for effective and fair workouts from the 
voluntary process would be much improved. However, no such official system currently 
exists. 
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5. CONCLUSION: A PATH TO GREATER                  
EFFECTIVENESS AND JUSTICE 
In all, one may conclude that the Principles are a mixed bag. They contain some useful 
guidance for debtor/creditor relations in good times, in particular regarding issues of 
government transparency and investor relations programs, although they missed the 
opportunity to call for greater creditor transparency. Their call for creditor discussion of 
domestic policies with borrowing governments may be appreciated, although with the 
caveat that the creditor discussions be among other discussions that open governments 
should hold regularly with all their stakeholders. Also, the Principles seem potentially 
useful when a loss of international investor confidence threatens a liquidity crisis, 
assuming that the private sector leaders that consult with the government can in fact help 
overcome market resistance to uninterrupted government access to its regular sources of 
external credit (and not overcharge for the assistance).  
However, for all the reasons detailed in this paper, the Principles seem weakest in the area 
in which the need is the greatest, facilitating effective and fair — as well as orderly — 
workouts from sovereign debt crises. The “voluntary” processes in the Principles leave the 
players free to exercise the powers that they have. Principles that are more balanced and 
reliable, coupled with some form of credible and fair enforcement mechanism need to be 
added to the model to create incentives and pressures for participants to reach a deal that 
gives greater weight to the obligations of the government to its people, and not just to the 
relationship of the government with its creditors.  
One may speculate as to why international bankers dealing with emerging markets were 
drawn to developing their Principles. The project gained momentum when the SDRM 
proposal was actively being considered and thus could be seen as a more creditor-friendly 
alternative. It also fit with their experience, as we will suggest now. But it under 
appreciated the legitimizing and disciplining role of official processes in a sovereign debt 
workout. We conclude by suggesting what such a role might comprehend. 
5.1. Nostalgia in the Voluntary Model 
Why was the international financial industry, or at least the major international commercial 
and investment banks that are prominent in IIF, drawn to the purely voluntary model? One 
may only speculate, but there could be a number of reasons. First is that the leadership 
among IIF members includes several alumni of the 1980s sovereign bank debt crises, 
where creditor committees were a basic part of the workout strategy.33 Second is that 
whereas the commercial banks worked closely with their home governments and the IMF 
in the 1980s, especially in the early 1980s, creditor institutions in the first years of the 
present decade had become quite unhappy with what they perceived to be a reduced 
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 Indeed, IIF’s initial essay into principles for renegotiating emerging market bond debt noted: “Formal 
negotiation with creditor committees remain a viable option. Recent experience demonstrates that the 
London Club process need not be restricted to commercial banks but can be adapted to a broader group of 
creditors” (IIF, 2001, p. 7). International bondholder committees also functioned in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, albeit in a world of less fluid communications and financial markets. 
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intention of the IMF and their home governments to defend creditor interests in sovereign 
debt crises.34 Thus, the central thrust of the Principles is that the creditors and the debtor 
should work out the difficulties directly between themselves. This would require some 
organization on the part of the creditors. However, as some bondholders are ferociously 
independent, only a voluntary set of principles could feasibly win their support (as noted 
above, this strategy largely failed anyway to hold the “buy side” close to the Principles). 
One may offer an additional hypothesis, also based on the fact that commercial bankers 
have been at the center of the Principles exercise. One underlying notion was that a better 
working relationship between a sovereign and its creditors could smooth out a crisis. 
Perhaps this was meant to be analogous to the way that a business owner might sometimes 
work with her banker to get through a difficult period. In a relationship of trust and mutual 
confidence, the banker would extend additional credit, taking on more risk, while the firm 
made adjustments to remain solvent. In fact, relationship banking works in many 
circumstances. It works at the level of traditional, small-scale community banks (as in 
some rural parts of the United States), or in the special relationships that microfinance 
institutions cultivate with their clients (as in myriad developing countries), or even and at 
least for a period of time when there is a deeper economic and social relationship (as in 
traditional Japanese corporate networks tied to their main banks).  
But to say relationship banking “works,” means only that sometimes it can resolve a 
difficult situation for a solvent enterprise with good prospects. Other times the firm indeed 
goes bankrupt and an arm’s length insolvency process with credible incentives and 
sanctions must take over. Moreover, it seems that relationship banking in the corporate 
sector has itself been in long-run decline in developed countries, where the growth of 
securities markets and asset-backed securities has given firms of a certain size increasing 
ability to lessen their dependence on banks for financial resources and thus lessen the value 
of the “relationship.” The commercial banks, in turn, have become less dependent on 
lending their own funds to firms and keeping the loans on their books. Instead, 
increasingly banks turn all types of loans that lend themselves to securitization into 
financial instruments that they then offload into the market, and many more commercial 
banks than before are now also performing as investment banks and underwriting 
securities, all of which makes them increasingly transaction based rather than relationship 
based (United Nations, 1999, pp. 125-136).35 If financial market development and 
innovation have lessened the role of relationship banking at the corporate level, one should 
not be surprised to see a similar development at the sovereign level. Indeed, this is already 
happening. In short, if the authors of the Principles were thinking in terms of relationship 
banking, they were being nostalgic. 
In fact, the concept of relationship banking as banks have practiced it with companies, 
should not fully apply at the sovereign level. The government has reporting responsibilities 
that preclude (or should preclude) a confidential relationship with its external creditors that 
a firm’s management could have. Also, banks do not lend their own funds to governments 
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 In the United States, for economic and political reasons, the White House and the Treasury were openly 
sympathetic to the Argentine need for significant debt reduction (see Helleiner, 2005).  
35
 This was not meant to be a forecast that commercial banks would disappear from corporate finance in 
developed economies, as they are still major developers of non-standardized lending (see Rajan, 1998). 
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as much as they did in the past, but rather arrange bond issues that they sell to a public 
market. They thus cannot operate as confidentially as when they carried the loans on their 
own books. Also, they cannot so easily arrange “concerted lending” by bondholders the 
way they did with commercial banks in the 1980s. Bondholders are very widely dispersed 
and have the option to sell their bonds,36 however much at a discount, rather than become 
tied into a continuing relationship with the sovereign. It seems that in any large-scale 
restructuring, the voluntary creditor committee would have to be unusually good at 
“herding cats.” 
5.2. Adding Legitimacy and Discipline 
The reason for concern about the efficacy of a voluntary sovereign debt workout under the 
Principles has nothing to do with the quality or commitment of the individuals involved, or 
even with the pro-creditor bias in the Principles as drafted. A more balanced set of purely 
voluntary principles would have the same defect, which is in the structure of the situation: 
parties with diverse and to some extent inconsistent interests and priorities are meant to 
cooperatively and in a purely voluntary way reach an appropriate solution to a sovereign 
debt crisis. The almost universal existence — and prescription — of effective bankruptcy 
laws at the national level to handle corporate insolvency suggests that there is no empirical 
— let alone theoretical — basis for putting confidence in a purely voluntary insolvency 
process.37 There needs to be a mechanism to maintain the discipline of the framework for 
crisis resolution, which is the usual role of the bankruptcy court. This is not a job for the 
“invisible hand.” The same structural need — if not the same solution — must surely apply 
for the same negotiation at international level. 
And yet, all efforts to create a sovereign insolvency process thus far have been stillborn. 
There is great political antipathy to developing anything like a mechanism to recognize 
sovereign bankruptcy. One may then ask whether the international community could 
develop a system that delivers at least some of what a bankruptcy regime delivers. Is there 
some other way to increase discipline and responsibility in creditors and debtors that is less 
than a bankruptcy regime and more than a voluntary code of good conduct?  
It seems that in fact a tentative step in a promising direction was already taken early in this 
decade, although it was overwhelmed by the SDRM and CAC debates. As noted earlier, in 
2002, IMF proposed a set of principles for orderly debt workouts in elaborating its “good 
faith” criterion for lending into arrears. Originally viewed as a device to bring reluctant 
creditors to the negotiating table, it became in the eyes of the creditor community a device 
to bring a reluctant debtor government to the table to negotiate with its creditors. This 
appears to be something on which to build. 
Three steps would be needed. First, a more complete and internationally agreed statement 
of what “good faith” means in the context of workouts from a sovereign debt crisis would 
have to be elaborated. Second, a mechanism would be needed to decide whether the 
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 In fact, many institutional bondholders are forced to sell defaulted paper or paper that is downgraded to 
sub-investment grade.  
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 See Stiglitz (2002) for a comparison of private and sovereign insolvency and the workout regimes that 
govern the former and are missing from the latter. 
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relevant parties in a specific debt crisis workout were in fact acting in “good faith.” Third, 
the official international community — in particular, debtor governments, the IMF and 
other international financial institutions, and the creditor governments — would have to 
have pledged to be guided by the internationally agreed criteria of “good faith” and by the 
findings of the country-specific mechanism, and then they would actually have to do so.  
The first step is to decide what the contents of the “good faith” criterion should be. As 
noted at various points in this paper, the IIF Principles seem biased toward the creditors. 
Other authors have offered other ideas.38 This author’s preference is that a broad 
international process with the participation of all concerned stakeholders be convoked to 
decide on the content of “good faith” actions by sovereign debtors, and by private and 
official creditors. While all relevant stakeholders should participate, the end result would 
have to be a text agreed by governments and reflect a genuine political consensus. Some 
stakeholders would perforce be disappointed. But there is a public purpose here that has to 
override narrow interests when they do not fully cohere with the public one. The key is to 
properly identify the public purpose and the principles that it should embody. The United 
Nations has a tradition of establishing both ad hoc and standing forums to elaborate 
normative standards for international economic relations. One simple way the UN General 
Assembly could set the process in motion in this case is by requesting UNCITRAL (the 
well-regarded United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) to develop a 
recommendation for its consideration. But other ways could also be conceived. 
The second step is where we enter the issue of strengthening discipline in debt workouts. 
While not conceived as a treaty obligation, the “good faith” principles should not be 
violated lightly. But assessing whether “good faith” in fact existed could not be left to 
possibly self-serving interpretations by different creditors or the debtor itself. Some 
international authority that is held in high regard by all the players as neutral, principled 
and technically competent would have to reach such a judgment. Were it perceived to 
satisfy all these criteria, the IMF Executive Board would be the prime candidate to be that 
authority. Perhaps a reformed IMF, or a successor international organization that was not 
itself a creditor, might make the assessment. Alternatively, perhaps an ad hoc panel of wise 
men and women acceptable to debtor and creditor governments could be constituted when 
needed to interpret whether the debtor and its creditors were acting in “good faith.”39 The 
international discussion to elaborate the concept of “good faith” could also design the 
mechanism to judge individual cases. 
The third step is that the IMF and other official creditors would be expected to continue 
supporting a debt-crisis country that was deemed to be acting in good faith. To be credible, 
a withdrawal of international support (other than emergency or humanitarian assistance) 
would have to accompany a finding by the authority of debtor government “bad faith”. By 
the same token, a finding of debtor government good faith should signal to creditors that 
the international community regards the country as seeking to cooperate in resolving its 
                                                 
38
 In addition to the recommendations referenced in table 1, Lee Buchheit and Rosa Lastra (2007, p. 23) have 
recently made a concrete proposal that is explicitly in the context of fleshing out the criteria for “good faith”. 
39
 Several suggestions that could be reinterpreted as applying to ways to constitute such a body may be seen 
in the column denoted “institutional framework and process” of the comparative table of proposals for 
improved debt workouts in Kaiser (2008). 
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debt difficulties. Creditors, both official and private, would be expected to follow whatever 
specific debt negotiation or discussion processes they mutually deemed appropriate, as 
long as the processes satisfied the good faith principles. No single model need be assumed 
superior to all others for all situations. On the other hand, if some group or individual 
creditors were found not to be acting in good faith, it could constitute an assignment of 
blame for difficulties in reaching an appropriate workout. While it is admittedly hard to 
conceive what sanctions might be imposed on “badly behaved” official creditors (beyond 
political opprobrium), there is an opportunity in that “badly behaved” private creditors are 
likely to seek succor in the courts.  
More precisely, it is proposed that the courts in creditor countries not accommodate 
uncooperative private creditors under this regime. If, for example, a speculative investor 
went to court in the country whose laws governed a bond contract to press his claim 
against a defaulting sovereign, an intervention (let us say an amicus curiae or equivalent 
brief) from the government would have weight with the judge if it said the case is 
progressing under the internationally endorsed workout process, that the debtor and the 
majority of its creditors were acting in “good faith” and that this government is committed 
to seeing the matter resolved through the agreed international process. The argument in 
such a brief would have to challenge the legal arguments made by the uncooperative 
investor, but its force would essentially be political, namely that a court finding for the 
creditor would undermine international cooperation obligations that the creditor 
government supported. Is this not, in fact, part of the story of Argentina in the US courts?40 
In short, it seems that the force of the international agreement could trump individual 
creditor contract rights that might otherwise carry the day outside the scope of the 
agreement. Governments would be bound by their acceptance of the principles and process 
to honor findings of good faith. As regards private creditors, it is the role of the judge 
before whom non-cooperative claims for repayment are made to balance legal, political — 
and, indeed, human — imperatives in reaching her decisions. However, one may envisage 
one further step to make the matter even more unambiguous once the “good faith” criteria 
were developed. That is, a pledge to act in good faith as so defined in resolving disputes 
could be inserted into new sovereign bond contracts. As with CACs, it is doubtful such a 
contract modification would disadvantage debtors in any way or discourage lenders.41 It 
would seem at least at first glance as no more odious than standard arbitration clauses in 
commercial contracts.  
As it is, the IMF has planned to revisit its lending-into-arrears policy — and could 
reconsider its “good faith” criterion — as part of its medium-term work strategy. While 
                                                 
40
 Indeed, the United States government made a judicial intervention over a sovereign debt crisis for the third 
time since the 1980s when two firms holding defaulted Argentine bonds sought to capture payments by the 
Argentine government to the IMF. The intervention was through a “Statement of Interest of the United 
States,” requesting that the court “bar plaintiffs from interfering with payments by Argentina to its creditors” 
(US Government, 2004, p. 20). In its brief, the government spoke of its “foreign economic policy” to 
promote “orderly and consensual restructuring of sovereign debt” (p. 2) and that the plaintiffs’ intentions, in 
essence, were not helpful.  
41
 Court challenges could still be mounted, but would likely be based on claims that one party or another did 
not follow the good-faith guidelines, which either might nullify the agreement or the requirement of the 
creditor to be bound by the good-faith principles himself. 
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nothing of the scale that is proposed here is envisaged (indeed, the Fund could be 
pressured to cede the “good faith” territory to the Principles), nothing precludes it either, or 
that the international community take up the matter in a different forum, as suggested 
above. It is a matter for international debate whether the “good faith” criterion might be the 
handle on which to elaborate and explicitly endorse agreed principles and processes that 
would raise the confidence of people in developing countries as well as creditors of 
reaching orderly, effective and fair workouts when sovereign debt crises become 
unavoidable. It is only hoped that the ideas presented here might stimulate thinking on 
ways to improve on the situation as it exists today. 
35 
REFERENCES 
Argentina, Republic of (2004). “Observations Regarding the ‘Principles for Stable Capital 
Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets’” unpublished paper 
available at 
www.mecon.gov.ar/finanzas/download/critica_a_principles%20_final_%20exe.pdf.  
Berensmann, Kathrin (2003). “Involving Private Creditors in the Prevention and 
Resolution of International Debt Crises.” German Development Institute, Reports 
and Working Papers 8/2003. Bonn. 
Bolton, Patrick and David A. Skeel, Jr. (2008). “Time to Rethink Sovereign Bankruptcy: A 
New Role for IMF?” This volume. 
Buchheit, Lee C. and Elizabeth Karpinski (2006). “Grenada’s Innovations.” Journal of 
International Banking and Regulation (Issue 4), pp. 227-231. 
_____ (2007). “Belize’s Innovations.” Butterworths Journal of International Banking and 
Financial Law (May), pp. 278-280.  
_____ and Rosa M. Lastra (2007). “Lending into Arrears — A Policy Adrift,” unpublished 
(June 4 draft). 
Cosío-Pascal, Enrique (2008). “Paris Club: Intergovernmental Relations in Debt 
Restructuring.” This volume. 
Couillault, Bertrand and Pierre François Weber (2003). “Towards a Voluntary Code of 
Good Conduct for Sovereign Debt Restructuring.” Financial Stability Review 
(Banque de France), No. 2 (June), pp. 154-162. 
Council on Foreign Relations (2000). “Roundtable on Country risk in the Post-Asia Crisis 
Era: Identifying Risks, Strategies, and Policy Implications: Key Recommendations 
from Working Group Discussions 10/99-9/00.” (Available at 
http://www.globalclearinghouse.info/POC4/Documents/CFR%20Report%209-11-
00.doc).  
Damill, Mario, Roberto Frenkel and Martín Rapetti (2008). “The Argentine Debt: History, 
Default and Restructuring.” This volume. 
Fischer, Stanley (2001). “International Economic Policy under the Clinton 
Administration.” Comments at a conference at the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, June 27 (available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/062701.htm). 
Garay Salamanca, Luis Jorge (2008). “The 1980s Crisis in Syndicated Bank Lending to 
Sovereigns and the Sequence of Mechanisms to Fix it.” This volume. 
Gelpern, Anna (2004). “Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings.” 
36 
Emory Law Journal, vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 1115-1157. 
_____ (2005). “After Argentina.” Policy Briefs in International Economics. Institute for 
International Economics (September). 
_____ and Mitu Gulati (2008). “How CACs Became Boilerplate: A Story of Market-Based 
Change and the Governments that Made it Happen.” This volume. 
Group of Seven (1999). “Report of the G7 Finance Ministers to the Köln Economic 
Summit.” Cologne, June 18-20. (Available at 
www.library.utoronto.ca/ca/g7/finance/fm061999.htm). 
Group of Ten (1996). The Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises: A Report to the 
Ministers and Governors Prepared Under the Auspices of the Deputies. Basel: 
Bank for International Settlements. 
Hagan, Sean (2005). “Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt.” 
Georgetown Journal of International Law, vol. 36, No. 2 (Winter), pp. 299-402. 
Helleiner, Eric (2005). “The Strange Story of Bush and the Argentine Debt Crisis.” Third 
World Quarterly, vol. 26, No. 6 (September), pp. 951-969. 
Herman, Barry (2003). “Mechanisms for Dialogue and Debt-Crisis Workout That Can 
Strengthen Sovereign Lending to Developing Countries.” In Ariel Buira, ed., 
Challenges to the World Bank and IMF: Developing Country Perspectives. 
London: Anthem Press (for the G24 Research Program), pp. 203-226. 
_____ (2007). “Doing the Right Thing: Dealing with Developing Country Sovereign 
Debt.” North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation. 
Vol. 32, No. 4 (Summer), pp. 773-817. 
Institute of International Finance (2001). “Principles for Private Sector Involvement in 
Crisis Prevention and Resolution, January, 2001.”  
_____ (2005). Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in 
Emerging Markets.  Washington, D.C.: IIF. 
_____ (2006). “Strengthening the Framework for Emerging Markets: The Role of Debtors, 
Markets and the International Financial Institutions.” The Ditchley Conference 
2006: Selected Background Papers by the Staff of the IIF. Washington, D.C.: IIF 
(June). 
_____ (2006a). Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in 
Emerging Markets: Report on Implementation by the Principles Consultative 
Group. Washington, D.C. (September). 
_____ (2006b). Investor Relations: An Approach to Effective Communication and 
Enhanced Transparency — Update of Key Borrowing Countries. Washington, D.C. 
37 
(September). 
_____ (2007). Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in 
Emerging Markets: Report on Implementation by the Principles Consultative 
Group. Washington, D.C. (October). 
International Development Association (IDA) and IMF (2007). “Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) — 
Status of Implementation.” (August 28). 
International Monetary Fund (1999). “IMF Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private 
Creditors.” [http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/lending.pdf] 
_____ (2001). “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises — 
Restructuring International Sovereign Bonds.” 
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/series/03/ips.pdf] 
_____ (2002). “Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors — Further 
Consideration of the Good Faith Criterion.” (July 30).   
_____ (2002a). “IMF Board Discusses the Good-Faith Criterion under the Fund Policy on 
Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors.” Public Information Notice No. 02/107, 
September 24, referring to the Board assessment made on September 4, 2002. 
_____ (2003). “IMF Standards for Data Dissemination: A Fact Sheet.” Washington, D.C. 
[on the web at www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/data.htm] (April).  
_____ (2004). “Investor Relations Programs — Recent Developments and Issues.” IMF 
International Capital Markets Department (October 26). 
_____ (2005). “Information Note on Modifications of the Fund’s Debt Sustainability 
Assessment Framework for Market Access Countries.” Policy Development and 
Review Department (July 1).  
_____ (2005a). The IMF’s Approach to Capital Account Liberalization: Evaluation 
Report. Independent Evaluation Office, IMF, Washington, D.C.  
_____ (2007). “Report of the Managing Director to the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee on the IMF’s Policy Agenda” (April 11). 
Kaiser, Jürgen (2008). Taking Stock of Proposals for More Ordered Workouts. This 
volume. 
Lee, Soo-wan and Ann Orr (1999). “The Financial Restructuring and Reform Program in 
the Republic of Korea: Progress and Constraints.” In Barry Herman, ed., Global 
Financial Turmoil and Reform: A United Nations Perspective, Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, pp. 93-108. 
38 
Porzecanski, Arturo (2005). “From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of 
Argentina’s Default.” Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 6, No. 1 
(Summer), pp. 311-332. 
Rajan, Raghuram (1998). “Do We Still Need Commercial Banks?” NBER Reporter 
(National Bureau of Economic Research), fall, pp. 14-18. 
Salmon, Felix (2004). “Bondholders Won’t Back New Principles.” Euromoney 
(December). 
Setser, Brad (2008). “The Political Economy of Sovereign Bankruptcy.” This volume. 
Spiegel, Shari (2006). “Lessons from Moldova on How Not to Borrow.” Unpublished 
manuscript prepared for the Task Force on Debt Restructuring and Sovereign 
Bankruptcy, Initiative for Policy Dialogue, Columbia University, New York. 
_____ (2008). “The Current Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Underestimated 
Bondholder Recoveries and Market Inefficiencies.” This volume.  
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2008). “Sovereign Debt: Notes on Theoretical Frameworks and Policy 
Analyses.” This volume. 
_____ José Antonio Ocampo, Shari Spiegel, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and Deepak Nayyar 
(2006). Stability with Growth: Macroeconomics, Liberalization and Development. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Sturzenegger, Federico and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (2005). “Haircuts: Estimating Investor 
Losses in Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 1998-2005.”  IMF Working Paper 
(WP/05/137). 
Suter, Christian and Hanspeter Stamm (1992). “Coping with Global Debt Crises: Debt 
Settlements, 1820-1986.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 34, no. 
4 (October), pp. 645-678. 
United Nations (1999). World Economic and Social Survey, 1999. New York: United 
Nations (Sales No. E.99.II.C.1). 
_____ (2005). Multi-Stakeholder Consultation On “Sovereign Debt for Sustained 
Development: Issues for Countries That Access Financial Markets” United 
Nations, New York, 7-8 March 2005. Secretariat Report of the Consultation 
(available on line under “Sovereign Debt for Sustained Development (2004-2005) 
at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/indexMulti-StakeholderConsultations.htm). 
_____ (2005a). Multi-Stakeholder Consultations on “Sovereign Debt for Sustained 
Development,” Concluding Session, Held in Conjunction with The Fifth UNCTAD 
Debt Management Conference, Geneva, 20-22 June 2005. Secretariat Report of the 




United States (2004). “Statement of Interest of the United States.” US District Court for 
the Southern District of New York in the case of Macrotecnic International Corp. v. 
Republic of Argentina and EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, January 12. 
Whitt, Jr., Joseph A. (1996). “The Mexican Peso Crisis.” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
Economic Review, vol. 81, No. 1 (January/February), pp. 1-20.  
 
